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The Dog That Doesn’t Bark:
Animal Interests In Economics
Abstract
Although animal welfare issues have become increasingly important
to the economic fortunes of many producers, the interests of animals
themselves are absent from standard economic analysis. By contrast,
scholars from other disciplines such as philosophy and law have exam-
ined animal issues in considerable detail. This paper outlines a simple
way of formally incorporating the insights of these disciplines within a
traditional economics framework. If animals have economic standing,
then current practice makes excessive use of animals as production
inputs and is thus economically inefficient. However, efficiency would
not, in general, entail zero use. Optimal usage depends on the costs to
animals and the benefits to humans and thus reflects the usual cost-
benefit tradeoff inherent in economics. Even if animals are accorded no
economic standing, externalities imposed on human producers leads
to similar qualitative conclusions.
JEL Classification: I28, J44, M52
Keywords: animal interests, economic surplus
“Just a robot?” A little passion entered her voice. “That’s the
argument always. Just. Just! Why should the Solarian, Bander,
have hesitated to kill us? We were just human beings without
transducers. Why should there be any hesitation about leaving
Fallom to its fate? It was just a Solarian, and an immature spec-
imen at that. If you start dismissing anyone or anything you
want to do away with as just a this or just a that, you can de-
stroy anything you wish. There are always categories you can find
for them.”
Asimov (1986, p302)
1 Introduction
Animal issues are increasingly fundamental to the economic interests of many
producers. In particular, farmers and other agents involved in food produc-
tion are well aware of growing consumer concerns about animal welfare. For
example, the United Kingdom’s Farm Animal Welfare Council has explored
the possibility of assigning animal welfare grades to all products for which
animals are an input. And research laboratories that make use of animal sub-
jects are the subject of ongoing scrutiny, and sometimes harassment. These
phenomena represent, at least in part, a growing belief that animals have le-
gitimate personal concerns – what I henceforth refer to as ‘animal interests’.
Researchers in some disciplines have directly confronted animal inter-
ests. The philosophers Rachels (1990), Regan (1983), and Singer (1975)
mount compelling cases for the assignment of various kinds of rights to ani-
mals, while Sunstein (1999, 2003) and Ibrahim (2007) consider animal issues
from a legal perspective. However, the contribution of economics has been
much more modest: standard economics models, to the extent they consider
animal welfare at all, view animals as property that has no direct economic
interests. As McInerney (2004) puts it, from the standpoint of economics,
“(farm animals’) value and importance is derived explicitly from what they
contribute to economic output...” and that “...(animals’) preferences and
wellbeing (have) relevance only to the extent that they are important to
(humans).”1 Similarly, Frank (2002, p421) notes that the usual economics
framework “...assign(s) zero value to the welfare of any sentient life with no
spending power.” Thus, most authors (e.g., Bennett and Blaney, 2002, 2003;
McInerney, 2004) at best view animal welfare as a standard public good
1Carlsson et al. (2003) note that such a human-centric definition of animal welfare has
obvious implications for the conclusions able to be reached.
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issue, where harm to animals imposes negative external costs on humans,
while ignoring the welfare costs of animal use on the animals themselves,
i.e., on animal interests. The sole exception is Blackorby and Donaldson
(1992) who, in a utilitarian framework that assigns explicit moral standing
to animals, conclude that their use in activities such as food production or
cosmetic testing is likely to be difficult to justify.
One possible rationale for this lack of interest by economists in animal
interests is that it merely reflects legal realities which deny standing to ani-
mals. But as noted above, this has not deterred scholars in other disciplines
from pursuing the topic. And economics has traditionally felt unconstrained
in pointing out the resource allocation implications of particular legal or in-
stitutional arrangements. Nor is there widespread unanimity on the standing
of animals that might render any incorporation of their interests in economics
models a purely academic exercise: as Leslie and Sunstein (2007) point out,
two-thirds of Americans in a 1995 poll agreed that “An animal’s right to live
free of suffering should be just as important as a person’s right to be free of
suffering.” Although the true support for such a statement is almost certainly
softer than the poll result indicates, it does, nevertheless, suggest that the
current complete absence of animal interests from economics is something of
a special case.
In this paper, I outline one possible way in which the insights of scholars
from other disciplines about animal interests could be incorporated within
a formal, but simple, economics model of resource allocation and discuss its
implications. This exercise suggests that current practice makes excessive use
of animals as production inputs and is thus economically inefficient. However,
efficiency would not, in general, entail zero use, although the efficient scale
in industries where the benefits of animal use are low (such as cosmetics
testing) may be such that production ceases entirely. I also consider possible
mechanisms for achieving the efficient allocation. Finally, I point out that a
broader consideration of human interests that takes account of documented
externalities leads to similar conclusions, even if animal interests are given
zero weight.
2 Economic Efficiency and Animal Interests
2.1 Modelling animal interests
To illustrate how animal interests might be incorporated in economics, and
to examine the implications of doing so, I use the standard welfare concept of
economic surplus. In the traditional economics framework, economic surplus
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 Figure 1: Conventional Economic Surplus. Consumer surplus is denoted by the
triangle labelled A; producer surplus by the triangle labelled B. Total economic surplus
equals the sum of these two areas.
equals the sum of consumer surplus – the amount that consumers benefit by
being able to purchase a product for a price that is less than they would be
willing to pay – and producer surplus – the amount that producers benefit by
selling at a market price that is higher than they would be willing to accept.
These concepts are illustrated in Figure 1, which contains demand and
supply curves for some arbitrary product that makes use of animals as inputs.
Given the supply and demand curves, unrestricted trading in this product
leads to the quantity Q? being purchased at price P ∗. As each point on the
demand curve represents the amount consumers would be willing to pay per
unit for the corresponding quantity, consumer surplus equals the triangle de-
noted by A. Similarly, each point on the supply curve represents the amount
producers would be willing to accept per unit for the corresponding quantity,
so producer surplus equals the triangle denoted by B. Total economic sur-
plus is then given by A+B. Moreover, since the economic surplus associated
with each possible quantity equals the area lying between the demand and
supply curves to the left of that quantity, it is obvious that Q∗ yields the
maximum-attainable surplus.
Economic surplus is commonly used by economists to address welfare
issues, but the underlying supply and demand functions incorporate only
direct human interests. For example, the supply function reflects only the
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costs of production incurred by human producers, and not the costs borne
by animals. That is, each point on the supply curve reflects the financial
cost to human producers of using animal inputs, but not the costs imposed
on, and endured by, animals themselves. As Dillard (2007), Ibrahim (2007),
Singer and Mason (2006) and many others point out, these costs can be
considerable: discomfort, stress, fear, pain, suffering and premature death.2
How might animal interests be incorporated in the economic surplus
framework? In principle, this requires only a straightforward modification of
the underlying concept, as follows:
‘True’ Economic Surplus = Consumer Surplus + Producer
Surplus− α(Animal Loss), (1)
where Animal Loss is the value of the welfare costs imposed on animals during
the production process and α ≥ 0 is a parameter representing the extent to
which such costs are recognised by economic modelling. These additional
terms warrant further discussion. In general, Animal Loss is designed to
capture the idea that the pain and suffering imposed on animals used in the
production process acts counter to animal interests and that this loss has a
monetary value. One – fairly conservative – way to make this concept more
concrete is to think of it as the monetary cost of the improvement to food,
living conditions and slaughterhouse techniques that would make animals
indifferent between being used for production purposes and not existing at
all. The parameter α then represents the extent to which this cost is given
economic standing. For example, α = 0 is the case considered by traditional
economics, while α = 1 corresponds to Singer’s (1975) ‘equal consideration
of interests’. In short, Animal Loss is the welfare cost to animals and α is
the portion of this cost that economists choose to recognise.
In this setup, the efficient price-quantity combination is that which
maximises (1). As noted above, this is (P ∗, Q∗) when α = 0; the important
question is how this might be changed by the recognition of animal interests,
i.e., when α > 0.
This issue is addressed in Figure 2, where the principle encapsulated
in equation (1) is captured by ‘adjusting’ the supply function to reflect the
costs imposed on animals in the production process. That is, rather than just
reflect the financial cost to human producers, each point on the supply curve
now represents these costs plus the monetary value of the costs imposed on
the animals used as inputs in the production process. Assuming the latter
2As Leslie and Sunstein (2007) observe, the demand function may also overstate the
true benefits due to consumers receiving insufficient information about these costs imposed
on animals, but I ignore this issue until section 2.3.
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Figure 2: Economic Surplus with Animal Interests. Recognition of animal inter-
ests (α > 0 in equation (1)) moves the supply function to the curve labelled ‘True’ Supply,
resulting in the quantity Q′ being purchased at price P ′. Compared to (P ∗, Q∗), (P ′, Q′)
has lower consumer and producer surpluses by an amount equal to the triangles CL+PL.
But it also has lower animal losses – by an amount equal to CL+ PL+AG – so its total
surplus is greater.
cost is a fixed amount per unit of production, this moves the supply curve
upwards and to the left about its origin on the vertical axis – depicted as
‘True’ Supply in Figure 2.
The magnitude of the shift in the supply curve depends on (i) the
costs imposed on animals in production (the value of Animal Loss) and (ii)
the extent to which these are recognised (the value of α). The principal
implications of such a change are as follows:
1. Because the new framework explicitly measures recognised animal losses
– depicted by the area between the two supply curves – the combination
(P ∗, Q∗) is seen to be economically inefficient. Compared to (P ∗, Q∗),
the situation (P ′, Q′) that arises under the ‘true’ supply curve gener-
ates lower consumer and producer surpluses – by amounts equal to CL
and PL respectively – but animal losses are also lower, and by the
larger amount AG+CL+PL. Hence, there is a net gain of AG and so
economic surplus is greater at (P ′, Q′) – where the quantity produced
is lower, implying less use of animals. This occurs because recognition
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of animal interests raises the costs of production, thus increasing the
price that must be paid by consumers for any given quantity of the
good, and hence lowering the actual quantity purchased. The original
allocation (P ∗, Q∗) appears to be economically efficient only because it
ignores these additional costs.
2. Nevertheless, for any finite level of costs imposed on animals as part of
the production process, the efficient use of animals is strictly positive
(even if α = 1). That is, so long as the true supply curve is not itself
vertical, its intersection with the demand curve – (P ′, Q′) – must lie to
the right of the vertical axis and hence a positive quantity of the good
is produced. This reflects the usual economic tradeoff between costs
and benefits: an input is used up to the point where the additional
gain from doing so is exactly offset by the additional cost.
3. As a result, the intensive use of animals can, in principle, be economi-
cally efficient even when the value of animal interests is explicitly recog-
nised – so long as the benefits from doing so are sufficiently great (i.e.,
the demand curve for the product is high and to the right in Figure
2). Some areas of medical research may, arguably, fit this criterion.3
At the other extreme, however, goods for which the benefits are low –
such as cosmetics testing and fur products – will see the supply and
demand curves intersect very close to the vertical axis. The resulting
quantity may not be of sufficient scale to maintain such industries, in
which case production could cease entirely. The same is potentially
true of goods that impose particularly severe costs on animal interests,
such as veal production and battery hen farming, since in such cases
the true supply curve will lie far to the left of the original curve.
2.2 Achieving animal interests
Although the principal goal of this paper is to illustrate how animal interests
might be incorporated within the methodology of economics, having done so
it is natural to ask how the efficient outcome (P ′, Q′) might be achieved.
Clearly, a sufficient mechanism for doing so is one that ‘moves’ the supply
curve from one that ignores animal interests to one that fully incorporates
these interests.
There are three principal ways by which this could be brought about.
First, a tax equal to the welfare-cost-per-unit-of-use could be imposed on
3Whether or not they do in practice will also depend on the availability of substitute
methods, such as computer modelling.
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the use of animals in production. By forcing producers to confront the costs
they impose on animals, the actual supply curve would be identical to the
true supply curve depicted in Figure 2, thus leading to the outcome (P ′, Q′).
However, this approach has a significant drawback: although the use of ani-
mals in production will decline to an efficient level, this will not benefit the
animals who continue to be used unless the government is able to find some
way of returning the tax revenue to these animals – a most unlikely outcome.
In short, although a tax would succeed in internalising the true cost of an-
imal use to producers, it provides no obvious mechanism for compensating
the animals on whom costs are imposed. Moreover, identifying, imposing
and collecting the appropriate tax for all of the myriad uses made of animals
would almost certainly be an administrative nightmare.
Alternatively, extensive animal welfare regulations could be imposed
on producers who use animals as inputs, effectively forcing such producers to
move to the true supply curve in Figure 2 and so meet the full costs of their
animals’ interests. Of course, such an approach is already followed in many
countries – albeit often in fairly diluted form (i.e., low α) – but its effective-
ness is severely hindered by weak enforcement. For example, responsibility
for enforcing animal welfare laws in the New Zealand agricultural sector lies
with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, but this organisation currently
has only five inspectors, or one for every 10 million animals. Funding for this
role has also declined in real terms in recent years, despite representing only
a tiny fraction of the Ministry’s budget; indeed, the Minister of Agriculture
openly admits to having more pressing priorities.4
A final approach, to be used in conjunction with the second, would
therefore be to confer legal standing on animals, thus enabling individuals
or organisations to undertake legal action on their behalf in order to ensure
compliance with welfare laws and regulations.5 Currently, animal welfare
prosecutions in New Zealand can be undertaken by only three agencies: Min-
istry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Society for The Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals, and the New Zealand Police. Of these, the enforcement capa-
bilities of the first are, as already discussed, severely under-resourced; the
second receives no government funding and so is similarly constrained, and
in any event tends to concentrate on domestic animals rather than those used
in production; while the third rarely uses its prosecutorial powers in animal
welfare cases. Empowering additional parties to undertake this role would
enable better enforcement of recognised animal interests, and thus move the
supply curve closer to its ‘true’ position.
4See New Zealand Farmers Weekly, 28 July 2008.
5See Sunstein (1999) for a more extensive discussion of this idea.
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2.3 Beyond animal interests
In the analysis above, I have assumed α > 0, i.e., that the welfare of animals –
from the perspective of animals themselves – matters and is recognised. Two
other cases also warrant consideration. First, where animal interests are un-
recognised, but human interests depend to some extent on the treatment and
welfare of animals. Second, where where animal interests are unrecognised
and human interests do not depend directly on animal welfare.
The first case is easily dealt with. Equation (1) becomes:
‘True’ Economic Surplus = Consumer Surplus + Producer
Surplus− α′(Animal Loss),
where α′ denotes the extent to which animal welfare enters the calculation
of human interests. Note that, because humans will rationally put their
own interests ahead of those of animals whenever a conflict arises, α′ < α.
Otherwise however, the analysis is the same as that depicted in Figure 2.
The second case is more difficult. At first glance, it might seem that
such a case is simply that considered by the standard economics paradigm,
thus invalidating Figure 2 and its accompanying discussion. However, this is
not necessarily the case. Dillard (2007) points to evidence from a variety of
sources suggesting that the highly unpleasant work undertaken by slaughter-
house workers results in their being subject to various kinds of psychological
trauma, including stress disorders, reduced empathy, and the development of
multiple personalities. Furthermore, Fitzgerald (2007) finds that slaughter-
house employment is associated with significantly increased crime, including
rape and other violent responses. Thus, those most actively involved in the
denial of animal interests seem to suffer adverse consequences from doing so,
and, at least in some cases, impose those consequences on others.6
Such outcomes are, of course, straightforward manifestations of a neg-
ative externality: because the psychological costs of slaughterhouse employ-
ment typically only show up after some period of time, slaughterhouse em-
ployers are able to avoid bearing these costs as part of the employment rela-
tionship, effectively transferring them first to the employees and subsequently
6An alternative interpretation of this evidence is that individuals able to tolerate slaugh-
terhouse working conditions are more likely to have violent and criminal tendencies. If
this were true, then it is no longer so clear that the slaughtering of animals has unrecog-
nised social costs. Indeed, at least so long as α = 0, it could even be beneficial, insofar as
slaughterhouse work may offer an ‘escape valve’ for personalities that might otherwise act
against humans.
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to society. In this case, Equation (1) becomes:
‘True’ Economic Surplus = Consumer Surplus + Producer
Surplus− α′′(Animal Loss),
where α′′ denotes the extent to which animal welfare costs impose negative
externalities on human interests. As with all negative externalities, the failure
to internalise these costs results in a supply function that under-estimates the
true cost of production (i.e., a supply curve that lies too low and/or to the
right), leading to too much slaughterhouse employment and, hence, to too
great a use of animals. In short, even when α = 0 (so that animal interests
have no direct economic standing), the external costs of animal usage on
humans means that the analytical picture is essentially the same as in Figure
2.
3 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have outlined a simple way of incorporating the ‘animal
interests’ insights of legal and philosophy scholars within a formal economics
framework, and explored the consequences of doing so. Although similar
to the standard economics analysis of externalities, my contribution is more
radical (and similar to that of Blackorby and Donaldson, 1992), focusing as
it does on the animal usage costs imposed directly on the welfare of animals
themselves, rather than simply those that humans are willing to accept as
having negative implications for their own welfare.
Unsurprisingly, relative to the standard economics framework that ig-
nores animal interests, the new framework suggests that animal usage is
almost certainly too high. On purely economic grounds, however, involving
a comparison of costs and benefits, optimal usage is unlikely to ever be zero.
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